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From the History to the Theory of Administrative
Constitutionalism
Sophia Z. Lee∗
There is a natural affinity between history and the study of how agencies
interpret and implement the Constitution, what scholars call “administra-
tive constitutionalism.”1 The number of historians incorporating adminis-
trative constitutionalism into their work is growing.2 At the same time,
∗ Thanks for helpful feedback go to Jean Galbraith, Jeremy Kessler, Jerry L. Mashaw, Gillian
Metzger, Nicholas Parrillo, Karen Tani, the participants at Columbia Law School’s Adminis-
trative Constitutionalism Workshop, and the Yale Law School conference in honor of Jerry L.
Mashaw.
1 This chapter defines administrative constitutionalism to include only agencies’ interpretation
and implementation of the United States Constitution. Other scholars have proposed broader
definitions of the term. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn use the term “administrative con-
stitutionalism” to refer to the process by which legislators, executives, and administrators work
out “America’s fundamental normative commitments,” a process that “include[s] but [is] not
limited to Constitutional analysis.” William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, A Republic of
Statutes: The New American Constitution 33 (2010). Gillian Metzger would also include
“the statutes and legal requirements that create and govern the modern administrative state.”
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1897, 1899 (2013). Jerry
L. Mashaw uses the term to describe the “institutional and legal developments” that secured the
constitutional legitimacy of the early administrative state. Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the
Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Admin-
istrative Law vii (2012). I am not opposed to these broader definitions. If they are adopted,
however, it would be helpful to have a way linguistically to differentiate the overlapping but
distinct topics of how agencies create constitutional meaning and how administrative law doc-
trines ensure the constitutionality of administration itself, what Mashaw and at times Metzger
use the term to describe, or how the regulatory state more generally shapes the nation’s core
commitments, as Eskeridge and Ferejohn use the term.
2
Sophia Z. Lee, The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to the New
Right (2014) [hereinafter Lee, The Workplace Constitution]; Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex,
and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present,
96 Va. L. Rev. 799 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking]; Karen M. Tani,
Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the
Poor, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (2015); Jeremy Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern
Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (2014); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian
Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1457 (2015).
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legal scholars interested in administrative constitutionalism often look to the
past.3
This should not come as a surprise. Legal scholarship on administrative con-
stitutionalism grew out of the broader field of extra-court constitutionalism,
a body of work that emphasizes positive constitutional theory.4 Even scholars
more interested in the normative merits or demerits of administrative consti-
tutionalism find those usefully informed by actual administrative practice.5
And administrative constitutionalism often unfolds over time, accreting slowly
through memos, reports, adjudications, and regulations.6 The fact that agency
records are easier to acquire from the National Archives than through Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) requests also pushes scholars of administrative
constitutionalism into the past.7 At the same time, the history of administration
is burgeoning.8 As historians burrow into administrative agencies, they often
encounter the Constitution. Administrative constitutionalism gives a new lens
through which to view and understand their sources.
The points of contact between the history and theory of administrative con-
stitutionalism are sufficiently robust and growing to merit systematic analysis.
This chapter focuses on what history can offer the theory of administrative con-
stitutionalism. In particular, it argues that historical accounts of administrative
constitutionalism invite a more robust normative defense of the practice than
theorists have thus far provided.
3
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 1; Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitu-
tionalism, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 519 (2015); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism
and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 59.
4
Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (2004); Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution
(2009); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 (2003).
On positive constitutional theory generally, see Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us about
Constitutional Theory, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1537 (2004).
5 See, for instance, Metzger, supra note 1, at 1904–1909.
6 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) deliberated for over thirty years about its consti-
tutional duty to police racial discrimination by the unions it oversaw. Lee, The Workplace
Constitution, supra note 2, at 35–55, 97–114, 135–54, 175–93, 212–22.
7 While I could find rich archival sources on the Board’s internal deliberations during the 1940s
to 1970s, I lacked similar sources for the 1980s because such “deliberative process” material is
excepted from the records that the government must divulge in response to a FOIA request.
Compare id. at 135–74 with id. at 238–56.
8
Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges in
America, 1900–1940 (2014); Joanna Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Admin-
istrative Politics Since the New Deal (2012); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the
Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940 (2013).
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The normative debate about administrative constitutionalism is still rela-
tively nascent.9 Nonetheless, scholars have identified a number of questions
regarding the practice’s definition and defensibility. Some may be answer-
able in the abstract, but, in many instances, history sheds useful light on the
conversation. Below I use evidence from history to argue that administrative
constitutionalism may be virtuous even if it has qualities its critics reject and
lacks virtues its defenders seek. I argue in Section I that administrative consti-
tutionalism can be normatively desirable even if it is neither transparent nor
participatory. In Section II, I contend it is even defensible if it varies from
court doctrine and is contrary to congressional command.
i expertise and engagement as independent values
Scholars argue that it is desirable for agencies to be transparent and invite
public participation when they undertake administrative constitutionalism.
At times, they even seem to contend that transparency and participation are
definitional or normatively necessary. Below I use historical examples to argue
that fostering agency engagement with constitutional questions and benefit-
ting from agency expertise are independent values that warrant recognizing,
and normatively defending, administrative constitutionalism even when it is
opaque or nonparticipatory.
Defending Opacity
Gillian Metzger has asked whether, in categorizing an agency action as an
instance of administrative constitutionalism, it matters whether the agency
engages expressly with the Constitution when it publicly explains its action.10
History suggests that counting express published reliance on the Constitution
only would exclude from consideration instances when the Constitution plays
a strongly influential and even decisive role. Such a definition thus seems
descriptively under inclusive. As history indicates, that definition also avoids
important questions about how agencies should engage the Constitution.
In questioning whether agencies must explicitly and publicly rely on the
Constitution to engage in administrative constitutionalism, Metzger refer-
enced my work on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) during
9 Bertrall Ross observed recently that “no one has yet offered a comprehensive normative
account” of administrative constitutionalism. Ross, supra note 3, at 523 n.11.
10 Metzger, supra note 1, at 1898.
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the 1960s and 1970s.11 I found that the FCC, in adopting equal employment
rules for the broadcasters it regulated, considered constitutional arguments
internally and recognized them publicly.12 But the FCC found ultimately that
it need not decide its constitutional obligation to adopt those rules due to
its statutory authority to do so.13 The agency had substantial discretion as to
whether to exercise this authority, however, given its broad statutory charge
to regulate in the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”14 Thus, even
though the FCC avoided the constitutional question publicly, “equal protec-
tion turned a statutory can into a constitutional must.”15
Karen Tani has since unearthed multiple instances during the 1960s when
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) also publicly
“clothe[d] administrators’ constitutional interpretation in statutory garb.”16
For decades after the Social Security Act’s passage, agency officials relied on
equal protection to justify the restrictions it imposed on states’ administration
of federal public assistance programs. In the early 1960s, however, the agency
“steadily backed away from the business of constitutional interpretation,” at
least in its published explanations.17
The agency’s reasons for doing so differed in salient ways. As Tani recounts,
in 1961 its Secretary was dissuaded from declaring unconstitutional a Louisiana
law that denied benefits to mothers whose homes were deemed unsuitable. His
Assistant Secretary convinced him that such a ruling would raise congressional
ire and public concerns about executive overreach.18 The agency relied pub-
licly on its statute instead.19 In 1963, an agency lawyer counseled abandoning
the agency’s decades-long reliance on equal protection to justify why state wel-
fare plans could only use “reasonable classifications” to set eligibility.20 Now
that the Court had declared equal protection a powerful check on racial dis-
crimination, she urged, finding “‘that the Constitution followed every Federal
dollar to its ultimate destination,’” could lead to massive defunding of state
welfare programs.21 In her view, the agency’s “‘weapon’ . . . had become ‘too
big.’”22 She advised that the agency could and should use its statute instead
11 Id. at 1898 n. 11.
12
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 161–65; Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemak-
ing, supra note 2, at 810–34.
13
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 165; Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking,
supra note 2, at 833.
14 See, e.g., 47 USC § 309.
15 Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 834. 16 Tani, supra note 2, at 873.
17 Id. at 877. 18 Id. at 872–73. 19 Id. at 871. 20 Id. at 880. 21 Id. 22 Id.
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to reach results “‘quite similar to those obtained from the equal protection
rationale.’”23
HEW’s proffered reasons for “dressing constitutional concerns in statutory
garb” are questionable.24 Worrying that adopting a constitutional theory in
one instance will cause the agency to take on too much constitutional duty
across the board overlooks one of the defining features of the administered
Constitution. Because agencies engage the Constitution at their discretion, a
decision to implement a particular interpretation of the Constitution does not
have the same generalizing, precedential effect of a judicial interpretation.25
The agency’s constitutional weapon thus remains a scalpel not, as the HEW
lawyer warned, a “‘hydrogen bomb.’”26 Reaching a decision on constitutional
grounds but justifying it in statutory terms to avoid drawing the ire of Congress
and the public is troubling. Arguably doing so thwarts agency accountability
and undermines agency legitimacy. Indeed, Metzger warns that if agencies
rely on the Constitution internally but only statutes publicly, courts, Congress,
23 Id. at 881. 24 Id. at 873.
25 For the argument that generalization is a defining feature of law and legal reasoning see
Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. Va. L. Rev. 217 (2004). Scholars debate
whether judges’ constitutional decisions should or do have a binding effect on future cases.
For an overview and defense of constitutional decisions’ precedential (and thus generalizing)
effect, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107 (2008); see also Larry Alexander, Constrained by
Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
26 Tani, supra note 2, at 880. The scalpel/hydrogen bomb distinction can break down once an
agency is (or is anticipating) defending an action on constitutional grounds to a court. But if
an agency is acting rather than litigating – and particularly acting in a zone protected from
judicial review – the “hydrogen bomb” concern is inapt. While scholars have recognized weak
forms of agency stare decisis that result from courts’ “arbitrary and capricious” review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), this (1) presumes the agency is anticipating judicial
review, and (2) has only, as far as I am aware, been applied to the agency’s future decision
of the same policy issue, not like policy issues. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Legislative and
Executive Stare Decisis, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1339, 1350 (2008) (citing Motor Vehicles
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 US 29, 43 (1983)). The Office of Legal
Counsel’s own practice of stare decisis could also indirectly lead an agency to be bound at time
two by a constitutional position taken at time one. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the
Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1460 (2010). Because seeking OLC’s advice
is largely at the agency’s discretion, however, this would impose little constraint. Further, OLC
is most willing to depart from its precedents when requested to by the agency most affected
by them. Id. at 1489–91. Lastly, to the extent that agencies generalize not because they have to
but because they (like many institutions) develop norms and path dependencies, those forces
operate whether the agency is interpreting a statute or the Constitution; in other words, this
poses a different generalizing threat than the one the HEW lawyer feared.
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the President, and the public cannot hold them accountable for their consti-
tutional interpretations.27
Constitutional opacity is not illegal, however. If an agency can justify its
actions as being a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes and as
passing arbitrary and capricious review, it need not disclose any additional
constitutional influences. In a closed-record proceeding, any constitutional
arguments made by the parties would be part of the record on review. Oth-
erwise, the agency would only have to disclose constitutional considerations
if they were: (1) introduced by actors outside the agency; (2) “relevant to
the merits of the proceeding;” and (3) the outside actor was an “interested
person.”28 For open-record actions, an agency need only establish nonarbi-
trary reasons based on the information before it at the time of decision.29 If
it can do so without adverting to the Constitution, it should not run afoul of
arbitrary and capricious review. In the particular context of informal notice-
and-comment rulemaking, agencies have to disclose to the public during the
comment period some information on which it relies,30 but the courts have
yet to expand this to include legal analysis.31 Thus, with the possible narrow
exception of ex-parte contacts in closed-record proceedings, agencies do not
seem to be legally required to disclose constitutional influences to the public,
parties, or reviewing courts, provided they offer other nonarbitrary reasons for
their actions.
Whether there are reasons agencies should be legally required to disclose
constitutional influences is another matter. That case would have to be made
with reference to the normative values of administrative constitutionalism,
such as the opportunities it provides for public input into or interbranch dis-
cussion of constitutional questions, or to the normative values underpinning
administrative law more generally.32 To the extent that normative concerns
about agencies’ hidden resort to the Constitution persist, they only enhance
arguments to include such actions within the category “administrative consti-
tutionalism.” Accountability and legitimacy concerns may be reasons to press
27 Metzger, supra note 1, at 1902.
28 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 557(d)(1)(A)–(B).
29 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US 402, 419–20 (1971).
30 APA 5 USC § 553(b)–(c).
31 American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
32 Scholars have debated the analogous question of whether agencies should have to disclose
political influences on their decisions. See, for example, Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place
for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2 (2009); Nina A. Mendelson,
Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010);
Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 141 (2012).
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for more transparency, in other words, but they are not reasons to define such
background influences out of administrative constitutionalism.
Further, as is argued below, there are other values such as engagement and
expertise that can sustain administrative constitutionalism normatively in the
absence of transparency. Indeed, where they are in tension with transparency,
they may even trump it.
Questioning Participation
Theorists posit that administrative constitutionalism offers a more demo-
cratically accountable mode of constitutional interpretation that overcomes
the courts’ countermajoritarian difficulty.33 Indeed, agencies’ notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures are more publicly accessible than even the
legislative process, given that participation is of right.34 Scholars praise this
potential, observing that agencies can engage in a “more deliberative process”
than courts,35 and are more “constantly engag[ed] with the public.”36
Here the lessons history offers are complex. On the one hand, if the past is a
guide, there is nothing inherently public, open, or dialogic about administra-
tive constitutionalism. On the other hand, agencies have repeatedly opened
their constitutional deliberations to the public in ways that surpass the access
offered by courts or legislatures. Notably, they have done so of their own
accord, demonstrating that at least some agencies at some times embraced
administrative constitutionalism’s participatory potential.
Administrative constitutionalism is not categorically democratic. Jeremy
Kessler has unearthed how the Wilson Administration’s War Department
used the Constitution to create a military exemption for secular conscien-
tious objectors.37 As Kessler explains, this World War I policy was deeply
“countermajoritarian, frustrating the legislative will in the interests of a few
thousand idiosyncratic draftees.”38 But it was also undemocratic in the partici-
patory sense, forged through an internecine war of memos.39 Anjali Dalal has
33 Metzger, supra note 1, at 1928–29; Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Consti-
tutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 529 (2010); Ross, supra note 3, at 526.
34 Compare APA § 553(c) (requiring the agency to give “interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making”) with Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 US 441, 445 (1915) (“The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town
meeting or an assembly of the whole.”).
35 Metzger, supra note 1, at 1928. 36 Ross, supra note 3, at 574–75.
37 Kessler, supra note 2, at 1111–12, 1115, 1119–20, 1122. 38 Id. at 1115.
39 Id. at 1123–30. The issue of participation is distinguishable from that of opacity addressed
above. For instance, in the FCC example, the agency process was participatory, even though
the ultimate regulation’s reliance on the Constitution was opaque.
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recovered a similarly nonparticipatory instance of administrative constitution-
alism in the Justice Department’s and FBI’s evolving policy for domestic
surveillance in the late twentieth century.40 The Attorney General Guide-
lines on this subject and the FBI manual implementing them were developed
without public input.41
Administrative constitutionalism can, however, live up to the participa-
tory ideal. As Bertrall Ross has recognized, this is most necessarily the
case when agencies engage constitutional questions in notice-and-comment
rulemakings.42 The FCC used a series of notice-and-comment rulemakings
to consider requiring regulated entities to adopt equal employment programs
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.43 An early notice of proposed rulemaking
announced that the agency had before it arguments that it was constitutionally
obligated to adopt such a regulation.44 A range of individuals, officials, and
groups responded with an avalanche of constitutional argument.45 It was their
arguments that the agency recognized but avoided in its first equal employ-
ment regulation.46
Agencies have also fostered broad public participation even when that was
not statutorily required. In the 1970s, the NLRB considered when, procedu-
rally, to address a union’s racial discrimination: prior to or after certifying the
union as the exclusive representative of the workers it sought to represent?47 At
first, the Board attempted to adopt a procedural rule, which the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) does not require an agency to do via notice-and-comment
rulemaking.48 Still, the agency sought voluntarily the views of the lawyers who
practiced before it.49 The Board, unable to reach consensus on a rule, instead
decided in a series of split orders that it was constitutionally required to tackle
union discrimination before certification.50 Several years later, the agency
revisited this policy choice.51 Although it again eschewed notice-and-comment
rulemaking, this time in favor of adjudication, the Board nonetheless opted
for a far more open and participatory process than was statutorily required.
The agency notified the public that it would hold a hearing on the subject and
invited those interested to submit briefs on the question to the Board.52 That
process exposed the Board to a range of constitutional arguments, which its
members tested and debated during the hearing.53 Tani likewise describes
how HEW voluntarily considered a host of amicus briefs making Fourteenth
40 Dalal, supra note 3, at 99–102. 41 Id. at 97–98. 42 Ross, supra note 3, at 526, 574.
43
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 155–174. 44 Id. at 160–61.
45 Id. at 161–64. 46 Id. at 165. 47 See generally id. at 175–92.
48 Id. at 179–80; APA § 553(b)(A). 49 Id. at 183. 50 Id. at 182.
51 See generally id. at 212–22. 52 Id. at 212. 53 Id. at 215–17.
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Amendment arguments in its formal hearing about Louisiana’s suitable home
law.54
History thus supports the conclusion that administrative constitutionalism
can, but does not always, live up to the participatory ideal. More importantly,
history provides tools for considering whether it is (always) a problem that
administrative constitutionalism can fall short of that ideal. Dalal is critical
of what she calls the FBI’s “shadow administrative constitutionalism.” But
would it be better if Congress brought the public into the process? The same
APA provision that exempted the NLRB rule from notice-and-comment rule-
making also exempted the surveillance guidelines and manuals. Imagine that
Congress required the FBI to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
when it created otherwise exempt policies if the FBI was considering those
policies’ civil liberties implications. Faced with a choice between engaging
constitutional questions through public participation and not engaging them
at all, it seems likely the FBI would choose the latter (and in my opinion less
desirable) course.55 Indeed, Daphna Renan argues that some civil liberties
concerns can best be addressed through embedding such oversight within the
executive branch.56
Whether Kessler’s example of the War Department’s conscientious objec-
tion policy is an instance of administrative constitutionalism gone awry is more
complicated. The Secretary of War made a functional case for keeping the
program and its justification secret: “publicity of lenient treatment might have
encouraged ‘unconscientious’ objection as well as attacks from the Administra-
tion’s right-wing critics,” Kessler reports.57 One might add that the program’s
secrecy avoided raising Congress’s ire58 and the possibility of Supreme Court
review.59 Sorting out the merits of Kessler’s example involves working through
thorny and interlocking questions about the respective powers of the President
54 Tani, supra note 2, at 870. 55 But see Metzger, supra note 1, at 1902.
56 Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 211, 289–90 (2015); Daphna Renan, The
Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1039 (2016) [hereinafter
Renan, The Fourth Amendment].
57 Kessler, supra note 2, at 1124.
58 The administrators who conceived of the program constructed primarily the President’s
commander-in-chief powers. US Const. art. II, § 2. Whether the secular conscientious objec-
tion program actually fell exclusively within the President’s commander-in-chief powers or
trenched on Congress’ overlapping powers is an open question. US Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Some in Congress became aware of the Secretary of War’s program but only after the war was
over. See, for example, 57 Cong. Rec. 3234–35 (Feb. 12, 1919); 58 Cong. Rec. 3065–68 (July
23, 1919).
59 Assuming someone has standing to sue, the Supreme Court has been willing to police the
boundary and conflicts between Congress’s war powers and the president’s commander-in-
chief powers. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 591–93 (2006) (collecting cases).
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and Congress during wartime, the oversight Congress and the courts have over
the President’s exercise of his commander-in-chief powers, and the weight pol-
icy reasons such as deterring “‘unconscientious’ objection” should be given.
However one answers whether the program’s total secrecy was justified, the
reasons in favor of secrecy are most weighty as to the general public. Notice
to Congress may have been warranted,60 but opening the policy up for public
dialogue arguably was not.
The case for demanding public participation is strongest, but not airtight,
with regards to independent agencies. Those agencies do not share the secrecy
and national security interests of Dalal’s FBI or the military in Kessler’s case
study. Even in the case of independent agencies, however, while agency
action without public input lacks administrative constitutionalism’s partici-
patory virtue that does not mean it is therefore vicious. For instance, what if
the NLRB had forged a procedural rule to address its constitutional obliga-
tions without seeking public input? Congress could require such a rulemaking
to comply with some or all notice-and-comment procedures, but should it?
Such a constitutional carve-out from the general treatment of procedural
rulemaking would create the same disincentives for administrative constitu-
tionalism as in the FBI scenario above. By instead treating such a hypothetical
rule like any other procedural rule, an opportunity for public deliberation
might be missed but one for agency constitutional engagement would be
gained.
History suggests that agencies are capable of principled deliberation absent
public input. In 1955, the NLRB sua sponte appointed a committee of staff
members to study how the Supreme Court’s rapidly changing equal protection
doctrine of the late 1940s and early 1950s should affect the agency’s policies
governing union recognition.61 The committee carefully studied the case law
as well as the relevant statutory text and legislative history. These were expli-
cated and weighed in a detailed report, and the implications debated in two
concurrences.62 Likewise, in the procedural rulemaking example discussed
above, NLRB staff deliberated extensively about how to translate their consti-
tutional duties into agency procedure.63 There are no guarantees an agency
will proceed with commensurate deliberativeness. But checks other than
public participation are available; for instance, through ex post judicial
60 Cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 1189, 1237–39 (2006) (arguing that while the executive branch can in some circumstances
interpret statutes to avoid perceived constitutional problems, it should at the least notify those
in Congress with oversight authority over the statute in question).
61
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 102–06.
62 Id. at 102–03, 304–05 nn.15–16. 63 Id. at 179–80, 345 nn.12–13.
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review.64 Creating internal structures to ensure deliberation and check mis-
guided interpretations is another intriguing option.65
Thus far, theoretical writing has suggested public participation is a, if not
the, defining virtue of administrative constitutionalism. History supports partic-
ipation’s virtues, but also demonstrates that it may not be a necessary condition
to finding administrative constitutionalism virtuous.
Valuing Expertise
Theorists argue that administrative constitutionalism is desirable because it
allows administrators to bring their policy expertise to bear on constitutional
questions. This can enable agencies to reach and resolve constitutional
issues courts find outside their competency.66 Agency expertise can also
enhance the quality of constitutional interpretation. Ross favors administrative
constitutionalism because “agencies, as institutions staffed and structured
to regulate specific fields and actions, have a comparative advantage over
more generalist courts.”67 Metzger emphasizes that “agencies approach
constitutional questions and normative issues from a background of expertise
in the statutory schemes they implement and the areas they regulate.”68 As a
result, “they are likely to be better at integrating constitutional concerns with
the least disruption to these schemes and regulatory priorities.”69
Metzger and Ross point to different ways expertise benefits administra-
tive constitutionalism. Ross seems to have in mind what might be called
constitutional expertise. His leading examples involve agencies such as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that are, as he puts
it, charged with “fleshing out and applying statutes that rest on constitu-
tional values.”70 In implementing antidiscrimination laws, Ross contends, the
64 Any procedural rule the agency adopted would likely be deemed “final agency action” and
thus be subject to judicial review under the APA for, among other things, its constitutionality.
5 USC § 706(2)(B). Of course, a rule could be constitutional for purposes of section 706(2)(B)
irrespective of whether it was constitutionally necessary. Currently, the Supreme Court does
not appear inclined to examine an agency’s constitutional reasoning as part of its arbitrary
and capricious review under section 706(2)(A). FCC v. Fox, 556 US 502, 516 (2009). Gillian
Metzger argues that it should. Metzger, supra note 33, at 484–86.
65 Cf. Renan, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 56. 66 Metzger, supra note 33, at 514, 527.
67 Ross, supra note 3, at 579. 68 Metzger, supra note 1, at 1922.
69 Id. at 1922–23. See also Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 Harv. L.
Rev. 1890 (2016); Nicholas Parrillo, Administrative Constitutionalism and Administrative
Power, RegBlog (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/04/01/parrillo-administrative-
constitutionalism.
70 Ross, supra note 3, at 522.
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agency has “developed multiple applications of equal protection principles,”
from how to determine discrete and insular minorities to the proper intent
standard.71 Under this view, what agencies offer is expertise in the particular
constitutional value involved.
Metzger emphasizes what might be termed regulatory expertise. For Met-
zger what agencies bring to the table – and courts lack – is expertise in the
intricacies of a statutory and regulatory regime, as well as the subject areas and
entities the agency regulates. Unlike for Ross, there is no presumption that
agencies are expert in the particular constitutional value, be it free speech or
equal protection, they apply. Instead, agency expertise comes into play when
an agency’s regulatory domain intersects with ancillary constitutional issues.
In such instances, the argument goes, agencies are best suited to harmonize
the intersecting constitutional value with the particularities of their statutory
and regulatory regimes.72
History provides abundant examples of both types of agency expertise. In
terms of constitutional expertise, William Eskeridge and John Ferejohn have
described how, in the mid-1970s, lawyers at the EEOC fused their knowledge
of sex discrimination with a statutory charge believed to codify equal protection
requirements.73 The result was a cutting-edge theory of pregnancy discrimi-
nation as a form of sex discrimination that violated the employment discrim-
ination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII).74 As my work has
shown, during the 1960s and 1970s, the EEOC also argued that, under Title VII
and the constitutional provisions it implemented, “regulators must demand –
and regulated firms must establish – affirmative action policies.”75 During this
period, the United States Commission on Civil Rights, a watchdog agency,
likewise put itself forward not only as an expert on civil rights but also on how
the Constitution applied to that issue.76 Kessler’s account of the World War I
71 Id. at 561–62.
72 That said, an agency’s regulatory charge may develop its expertise in particular constitutional
problems, such as the FCC’s frequent interface with First Amendment issues. Thus, regulatory
expertise could, but need not, overlap with constitutional expertise. Vermeule, in Deference
and Due Process, argues that courts should defer to this sort of blended expertise. Vermuele,
supra note 69.
73
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 1, at 30–33. For the perception that Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 42 USC § 2000(e) (2012), codified the Constitution’s equal
protection guaranties, see Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 160–62. For
the Court’s ultimate rejection of this position, see id. at 219.
74
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 1, at 31.
75 Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 801. 76 Id. at 829, 849–50.
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conscientious objector program could also be seen as an instance of constitu-
tional expertise.77
Much of the extant historical work on administrative constitutionalism,
however, has produced examples of regulatory expertise. This was involved in
Tani’s account of the equal treatment requirements HEW imposed on state
and local welfare offices. It is also seen in the NLRB’s efforts to square its
policies with equal protection and the FCC’s adoption of equal employment
regulations. None of these agencies were created to administer equal protec-
tion. Their expertise was in income assistance, labor–management relations,
broadcasting, and common carriers. What they brought of value was their in-
the-weeds understanding of how to administer equal protection with minimal
interference to, or even salubrious congruence with, the statutory and regu-
latory ecosystem they oversaw. As an exception that proves this rule, during
the 1970s, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) declined to adopt equal
employment rules.78 Although the agency acknowledged the constitutional
values the rules would codify, it reasoned that they were too far afield from
the agency’s regulatory mandate.79 They could not, in the agency’s view, be
integrated into that ecosystem without threatening it.
Notably, expertise provides another benefit that can make administrative
constitutionalism normatively desirable even if it does not provide the benefits
of transparency or participation. In some instances, agencies were explicit
about their reliance on the Constitution (the NLRB’s certification policies, for
example). In others, such as the FCC’s equal employment rules, they were not.
Similarly, sometimes these exercises of agency expertise were participatory, as
was the case for the FPC’s equal employment rulemaking. But many were
not, including some of Tani’s HEW policies and all the examples above of
constitutional expertise.
ii respecting courts and congress
Before anyone coined the term “administrative constitutionalism,” Jerry L.
Mashaw weighed in on agencies’ “direct implementation of the Constitution”
77 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, a newly created independent agency, will
bring this sort of constitutional expertise to its work. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection and
Oversight, 42 USC §2000ee (2012).
78 See generally Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 193–211.
79 Id. at 202, 209–10. Notably, the Supreme Court accepted, with only slight modification, the
judgments of the FCC and the FPC as to whether equal employment rules were appropriate
for their regulatory regimes. Id. at 210.
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in a pathbreaking article on another little-studied subject: agencies approach
to statutory interpretation.80 In what was a generative, if brief, engagement with
the concept, Mashaw argued that agencies should interpret constitutionally
resonant statutory terms such as “hearing” to entail at least “the constitutional
minima that the Supreme Court has specified.”81 But, he contended, while
courts avoid statutory interpretations that raise serious constitutional questions
(known as the “constitutional avoidance canon”), agencies should not.82 “Con-
stitutionally timid administration,” Mashaw warned, “compromises faithful
agency [to Congress] and potentially usurps the role of the judiciary in harmo-
nizing congressional power and constitutional command.”83 Agency use of the
avoidance canon underscores Metzger’s observation that administrative con-
stitutionalism “fits uneasily with a constitutional system that vests legislative
power in Congress and judicial power in the courts.”84
Historical examples introduce nuances and counterarguments to this
debate. A conclusive argument is beyond the scope of this chapter. Below,
however, history and theory are marshalled to suggest that agency use of the
avoidance canon may actually be faithful to Congress and respectful of, even
collaborative with, the judiciary.
Dissecting Avoidance
Scholars divide the avoidance canon into two types. Under the “modern”
avoidance canon, courts identify and avoid but do not resolve the serious
constitutional questions a statutory interpretation raises.85 This can be
contrasted to “classical” avoidance, which held sway in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, according to which the courts answered the serious
constitutional questions a statutory interpretation raised in order to decide
whether an avoidant interpretation was warranted.86 The modern avoidance
canon is more aggressive toward Congress than its classical predecessor
because it can result in avoiding plausible interpretations of statutes that are
constitutionally questionable but not actually unconstitutional. It therefore
makes it harder for Congress to enact constitutionally questionable but
ultimately constitutional laws.87
80 Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 507 (2005).
81 Id. at 508. 82 Id. 83 Id. 84 Metzger, supra note 1, at 1920.
85 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 US 288, 347–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
86 Hooper v. California, 155 US 648, 657 (1895). For the classical/modern taxonomy, see Adrian
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945 (1997).
87 For examples of this critique, see Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance:
The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2128 (2015); Richard A.
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table 4.1 Formulations of the Avoidance Canon
Classical/Plausible Modern/Plausible
Classical/Implausible Modern/Implausible
Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt identify another divide in the courts’
deployment of the avoidance canon. In the standard formulation, the Court
uses avoidance to reject a plausible, but constitutionally questionable, statutory
interpretation in favor of another plausible interpretation. Katyal and Schmidt
observe that the Court also sometimes adopts implausible interpretations that
essentially rewrite statutes to avoid constitutional difficulty, what they call
“active” avoidance.88 Freed from their rhetoric of judicial activism, their tax-
onomy distinguishes between avoidance in favor of a plausible interpretation
(“plausible avoidance”) and an implausible one (“implausible avoidance”).89
Putting the criteria together, we get the four-by-four grid in Table 4.1.
Whether courts’ use of classical/implausible or modern/plausible avoidance
is more aggressive toward Congress depends on how persuaded one is by the
respective critiques of modern and implausible avoidance. But I expect that
most would agree that classical/plausible is the least and modern/implausible
is the most aggressive use of avoidance. Below, I defend agency use of all
four types of avoidance, roughly from least to most aggressive, illustrating each
through historical examples.
Agency Use of Classical/Plausible Avoidance
The mid-century NLRB developed a “contract-bar rule” that disallowed rival
unions from petitioning the agency to replace a Board-certified union for the
duration of that union’s contract with the employer. In 1962, the NLRB held
that it would not grant this protection to union contracts that segregated the
terms for black and white workers. The Board based its rule on “clear court
decisions . . . which condemn governmental sanctioning of racially separate
groupings.”90
Posner, Statutory Interpretation: In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev.
800 (1983).
88 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 87, at 2112, 2116, 2118.
89 The boundary between plausible and implausible avoidance will, like that between plausible
and implausible interpretations, be contested.
90 Pioneer Bus Co., Inc., 140 NLRB 54, 55 (1962) (citing, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347
US 483 (1954)).
124 Sophia Z. Lee
The NLRB’s 1962 order was an instance of classical/plausible avoidance.
There was nothing in the NLRA about the contract-bar rule; it was a policy
the agency built in the statute’s interstices. It was thus as plausible to interpret
the Act to include the 1962 exception to the rule as it was to interpret the Act to
allow the rule in the first instance. Further, the Board did not avoid a possible
constitutional problem; it chose its construction only after deciding that a
contract-bar rule without an exception for discriminatory contracts would be
inconsistent with the Court’s equal protection decisions. It therefore engaged
in classical rather than modern avoidance.
Even among critics of agency avoidance, this is an uncontroversial instance
of administrative constitutionalism. Mashaw has clarified that his concern
is with agency use of modern avoidance only.91 Nor should extrapolating
critiques of judicial use of the avoidance canon to the agency context pose a
problem because they focus on its modern and implausible variants. Indeed,
even those NLRB members who rejected more aggressive forms of avoidance
accepted the 1962 rule.92 Congress and the courts seem to approve as well.
Indeed, there is a long-standing tradition of agencies interpreting their statutory
authority to stay within their understanding of the Constitution’s commands
and Congress as well as the courts later adopting the resolution as their own.93
Agency Use of Classical/Implausible Avoidance
During the 1970s, the NLRB struggled with a perceived conflict between
its statutory and constitutional duties when it debated whether to consider
a union’s discrimination prior to certifying it.94 Board members disagreed
whether it would be unconstitutional for the Board to certify a discriminatory
union. But assuming that it would, could the Board therefore withhold certi-
fication given that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) stated that the
Board “shall certify” the results of a union election?95 Some Board members
had long opined that it was fine for the Board to incorporate constitutional
principles into policy choices that the NLRA left to the agency’s discretion (i.e.,
plausible avoidance). But if the agency was faced with an express and contrary
91 Email from Jerry L. Mashaw to Sophia Z. Lee (Dec 22, 2015) (on file with author).
92
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 147–48, 220–21.
93
Mashaw, supra note 1; Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the
Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 553 (2007); Ablavsky, supra note 2.
94 See supra notes 47–53.
95 The NLRA states that the Board “shall” provide a preelection hearing and that if the Board
“finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.” National Labor Relations
Act § 9(c)(1), 29 USC §401–531 (2012) (emphasis added).
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congressional mandate, the Board had to “assume [the directive’s] Constitu-
tionality” and do “what Congress intended.”96 For those who held this view,
the NLRA’s command meant that the agency could not deny certification to a
union that had won an election, regardless of any constitutional problems the
certification would raise.97 For others, the agency had a duty to interpret its
organic statute in light of the Constitution’s commands even when the latter
conflicted with the former.98 “What the Board lacks,” they insisted, “is not
the statutory power to withhold the certificate, but rather the constitutional
power to confer it.”99 Over several years, the Board flip-flopped from refusing
to providing certification to unions with a history of discrimination. As a Board
majority chastised in 1977, refusing certification had wrongfully “arrogated to
this Board the power to determine the constitutionality of mandatory language
in the Act we administer.”100
The NLRB was not faithless to Congress when it read a nondiscrimination
qualification into its certification policies notwithstanding statutory text to the
contrary. In 1954, the Court declared segregation in public schools unconsti-
tutional in Brown v. Board of Education.101 Legislatures did not need to amend
their laws to make this happen. Instead, those who implemented state and
local segregation laws were expected to assume they no longer had force. This
applied to all school districts, not only to the handful that were defendants in
the cases before the Court. Indeed, the Court soon clarified that its rule applied
to state-imposed segregation generally, not only in schools.102 Administrators
who implemented the Court’s interpretation of equal protection despite segre-
gation statutes on the books were not being faithless agents to their legislatures.
Instead, we assume that legislatures intend to act constitutionally, an inten-
tion to which their agents are faithful if they make corrections when statutes
fall out of step with constitutional doctrine.103 If those school administrators
were not faithless agents, neither was the NLRB a faithless agent of Congress
when it used classical/implausible avoidance to limit its statute in light of the
Constitution’s nondiscrimination mandate.
96
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 148. 97 Id. at 182, 221.
98 Id. See also id. at 148–49. Note that this very debate was an instance of administrative constitu-
tionalism as the agency was grappling with structural constitutional questions about agencies’
relationship to Congress and the Court.
99 Id. at 182. 100 Id. at 221. 101 347 US 483 (1954).
102 See, for example, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 US 879 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam) (municipal
golf course); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 US 877 (1955) (mem.)
(per curiam) (public beach and bathhouse).
103 As discussed below at note 130, the Court’s canons of statutory interpretation are built on the
assumption that Congress intends to act constitutionally.
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The harder question is whether the NLRB was faithless to Congress when it
implemented equal protection despite doctrinal uncertainty as to whether the
agency’s involvement with discriminatory unions was the type of state action to
which that principle applied.104 In other words, although the agency reached
and decided the constitutional question as classical avoidance demands, the
correct answer was not as clear-cut as in the school segregation example above.
This aspect of the historical example presses questions about how, not just
whether agencies can employ avoidance, including the classical/implausible
variant. Even under these circumstances, the agency’s use of avoidance is
unobjectionable. Agencies are unlikely to take adventurous constitutional
positions in the first instance and all the more so when that position leads
the agency to reject an express statutory command. If an agency oversteps,
Congress has sufficient checks to counter a disfavored deployment of avoid-
ance. The most costly is a legislative override. But Congress has a number
of more easily wielded tools, including jaw boning by individual legislators,
oversight hearings, and appropriations threats or riders.105 Agencies, in turn,
have strong political incentives to fall in line when these are used.106
Nor was the agency usurping the judicial role. As to applying the Court’s
antisegregation rule, the NLRB was respecting – not usurping – the judicial
role. The case for usurpation is stronger as to the NLRB’s reliance on a theory
of state action broader than any the Court had adopted.107 But as the Court
later explained, it defined state action narrowly in part due to federalism
and separation of powers concerns.108 To use Larry Sager’s term, the Court
104 I discuss below whether the NLRB was justified in interpreting state action more broadly than
the courts. See infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
105 Congress’s ability to review agency avoidance may be rendered theoretical if the agency’s
action is secret. This suggests the desirability of a notice requirement. Cf. Morrison, supra
note 60.
106 For a classic example of agencies bowing to pressure from congressional committees, see
Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 L. & Contemp. Probs. 273,
288–91 (1993).
107
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 135–54, 175–222. This, however,
speaks to whether it is justifiable for agencies to employ classical/implausible avoidance on
the basis of constitutional interpretations that differ from the courts’, not whether agencies
use of this type of avoidance is justifiable at all.
108 American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 US 40, 52 (1999) (“Faith-
ful application of the state action requirement . . . ensures that the prerogative of regulating
private business remains with the States and the representative branches, not the courts.”);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful adherence to the ‘state action’
requirement . . . avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for con-
duct for which they cannot fairly be blamed”). See also Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 US 288, 295 (2001); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Trakanian, 488 US 179, 191 (1988) (quoting Lugar); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1004 (1982).
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“underenforced” the state action doctrine.109 If so, the Court anticipated that
officials could find that the Constitution’s equality guarantees applied even
when the Court would not find a state or federal actor liable for discrimination
by private entities. Under this reasoning, the NLRB was complementing rather
than usurping the judicial role when it relied on broader state action theories
than those the Court employed.110
The NLRB was not usurping the judicial role in another sense as well.
Some of its antidiscrimination policies were subject to judicial review. All
a union had to do if it was penalized under a Board policy it found to be
grounded in an unsupportable constitutional interpretation was to challenge
it in court.111 Judicial review was generally unavailable for the Board’s certifica-
tion policies as they were committed to the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.112
As a result, there was no judicial role to usurp. The case for the agency
deployment of classical/implausible avoidance is arguably even stronger here:
If the agency did not do it, no one would, leaving unreviewable agency action a
What matters here is state action doctrine in the 1970s, but note that even the more recent
United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000), which was widely seen as limiting the state
action doctrine, spoke to regulation of private individuals in the absence of state action not
the conditions under which state actors can find themselves sufficiently involved with private
discrimination to be constitutionally liable, other than dicta stating that maladministration
and non-enforcement of laws did not suffice. 529 US at 624–25.
109 Lawrence Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law,
88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410, 420 (1993). For an application of this argument to the administrative
context, see Metzger, supra note 33, at 514, 527.
110 Mashaw might accept the agency’s application of the Court’s antisegregation principle as
an example of acceptable “constitutionally ‘sensitive’ administration” but reject the agency’s
adoption of a broad state action theory as inappropriate “[c]onstitutionally timid administra-
tion.” Mashaw, supra note 80, at 508–09. Even as to an interpretation that diverges from Court
doctrine, however, an agency arguably does not break its faith with Congress. Congress, shares
(or ultimately owns) the responsibility to enforce those dimensions of the Constitution under
enforced by the courts. For all the reasons Congress delegates broad authority to agencies in
the first instance – expertise, efficiency, capacity to consider detail – as well as the regulatory
expertise reasons to favor administrative constitutionalism discussed above, Congress would
likely want agencies to determine when and how to implement the under-enforced Consti-
tution in the first instance. Should Congress disagree with an agency’s resolution, it is free to
correct the agency by oversight nudges or legislative overrides. Nor would an agency imple-
menting the under-enforced Constitution usurp judicial power. The Court’s very reasons for
under enforcing the Constitution mark its under-enforced dimensions as ones in which polit-
ically accountable actors, such as agencies subject to congressional and presidential oversight,
are best suited to determine the Constitution’s commands.
111 National Labor Relations Act § 10(e)–(f), 29 USC § 160(e)–(f).
112 NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 US 706, 709 (2001). Note that employers
can evade this bar on review of the Board’s representation decisions by refusing to comply,
eliciting an unfair labor practice order from the Board, and then challenging that action in
court. Id. at 709–10.
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Constitution-free zone.113 By this reasoning, the 1977 Board majority was wrong
to overturn the agency’s policy because that policy inappropriately arrogated
judicial power to the Board. In contrast, it would have been fine for the majority
to overturn the policy because it interfered too much with the agency’s statu-
tory charge, it could be addressed adequately post-certification, or the agency
was insufficiently involved in the pre-certification union discrimination to be
constitutionally liable for policing it.114
Agency Use of Modern/Plausible Avoidance
The FCC’s equal employment rulemaking seems most in line with the sort
of modern avoidance Mashaw criticized. In its internal memos and pub-
lic statements, the FCC identified a “serious constitutional question”:115 that
the agency might violate the Constitution’s equal protection commands if
it licensed a broadcaster that practiced employment discrimination.116 The
FCC’s lawyers recommended, and the agency publicly explained, that it
would avoid this question by interpreting its statutes to bar licensees from
engaging in this discrimination.117 Given those statutes’ broad “public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity” charge, this was a plausible interpretation of
the statute. Such agency deployment of modern/plausible avoidance should
not be categorically rejected. Indeed, it may actually be faithful to Congress,
opening a dialogue between agencies and their congressional overseers that
can forestall the more troubling judicial use of avoidance.
If the modern approach to avoidance is justifiable in the courts, it is justified
in agencies as well. One justification for the modern approach is that it creates
“resistance norms” that force Congress to be more explicit and thus deliberate
when it wants to act at the outer limits of its constitutional authority.118 To the
extent that such resistance is normatively desirable, having agencies employ
113 The argument that agency avoidance constitutes faithful agency extends to policy zones that
Congress has committed to the agency exclusively. There is no reason to think that Congress
intended agencies to be less constitutionally sensitive in this zone; indeed, the lack of judicial
review suggests Congress would want the agency to pick up the constitutional slack. That
court review may be unlikely or unavailable in some circumstances strengthens the case for
agency use of avoidance in another sense: the alternative would put the impractical weight
on Congress alone to police the United States Code for unconstitutional or constitutionally
dubious statutes and the administrative state for similarly troubling statutory interpretations.
114
Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 220–22.
115 Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 816.
116 Id. at 814–15. 117 Id. at 816, 833.
118 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549 (2000).
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modern avoidance greatly enhances the beneficial resistance Congress legis-
lates against: statutes will be interpreted by agencies far more than by courts.119
Further, the main critiques of the courts’ use of modern avoidance have
less force as regards agencies. Scholars critique modern avoidance because it
“enlarge[s] the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the
most extravagant modern interpretation of the Constitution.”120 This constitu-
tional “penumbra” can bleed from one statutory context to another.121 When
agencies deploy modern avoidance, there is less threat that a constitutional
doubt in one context will bleed into other contexts. This is due to the different
way precedent operates in courts as opposed to agencies.122 And if an agency
avoids an interpretation Congress prefers, Congress can correct an agency
more easily than it can a court. The only way Congress can override a court’s
avoidant interpretation is to enact its preferred interpretation, a large if not
entirely insurmountable obstacle.123 In contrast, as described above, Congress
has many more – and more easily wielded – tools to counter a disfavored
agency interpretation.124 The fact that agency precedent is far less sticky than
court precedent adds to the effectiveness of this oversight.125 While more spec-
ulative, the political costs to legislatively overriding an agency are likely lower
than those for overriding a court, which could make even that check more
easily wielded against agency avoidance. Modern avoidance by agencies thus
arguably has more of the benefits and less of the costs than when it is used by
courts.
Modern/plausible avoidance also need not create the “timid administra-
tion” or “faithless agency” Mashaw fears.126 The FCC’s equal employment
rules could have led the agency to deny some licenses it would otherwise
have granted. They thus might seem to have the timidity-inducing qual-
ity Mashaw was concerned about. But they also empowered the agency to
oversee a whole new dimension of regulated entities’ business: their employ-
ment practices. From the perspective of broadcasters as well as the consumers
119 Cf. Morrison, supra note 60. 120 Posner, supra note 87, at 816.
121 See, for instance, how the Court’s avoidant interpretation of the Railway Labor Act in Inter-
national Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 US 740 (1961) migrated to its interpretation of the
NLRA in Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 487 US 735 (1988).
122 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
123 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 87, at 2119 (contending that when courts rewrite statutes using
the avoidance canon, veto gates in Congress mean that the “the rewritten statute is sticky and
unlikely to go away”). On congressional overrides generally, see Matthew R. Christiansen
& William N. Eskridge, Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317 (2014).
124 See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 126 Mashaw, supra note 80, at 508–09.
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who petitioned for the rules, this was aggressive – not timid – regulation.127
Congress also found the agency rules neither objectionably timid nor faith-
less. Soon after their promulgation, the Senate rejected an amendment that
would have invalidated the rules128 and Congress eventually codified them
in the agency’s organic statute.129 And had Congress disagreed, it could have
nudged or even legislatively directed the agency to take a different course of
action.
The FCC was not usurping the judicial role either. Generally, just because
courts play a role in policing the outer bounds of legally permissible action,
we do not consider their role usurped by an actor they supervise trying to
stay within those bounds. Congress does not usurp the courts’ role in trying
to pass constitutional laws.130 Nor do we think an agency usurps the judicial
role by trying to act in a nonarbitrary and capricious manner.131 Why treat an
agency trying to act in a constitutionally faithful way any different? The case
for usurpation seems particularly weak in the FCC example because of the
availability of judicial review. The equal employment regulations could have
been challenged directly or,132 if the agency denied a license under them,
a broadcaster could seek judicial review of that decision.133 Had the agency
adopted its statutory interpretation to avoid a trivial or non-existent constitu-
tional concern, a court could find that it acted unreasonably or arbitrarily and
127 Metzger is more concerned with aggressive than timid administration. Agencies’ use of the
Constitution to aggressively implement their statutes, she notes, “fits uneasily with a consti-
tutional system that vests legislative power in Congress and judicial power in the courts.”
Metzger, supra note 1, at 1920. But, like Mashaw’s critique, this concern seems best directed
at the ends (timid, faithless, or aggressive administration) rather than the means, whether
modern avoidance narrowly or administrative constitutionalism broadly. Their concerns are
thus better addressed by debating how agencies deploy avoidance or otherwise implement the
Constitution and are less persuasive for deciding whether they should do so.
128 Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 853. 129 Id. at 878 n.359.
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Congress and the Constitution (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington, eds. 2005); Paul
Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21
Ga. L. Rev. 57, 62–65 (1986). Indeed, the Court’s avoidance canon is based on the assumption
that Congress intends to act constitutionally. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 US
288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
131 Elizabeth Magill has hypothesized that courts count on agencies internalizing the lessons
from judicial review of agency action not only to comply with those lessons but to guide
agencies’ choice of procedure ex ante as between adjudication and rulemaking. M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383 (2004).
132 Parties can even challenge directly agency interpretations of agency regulations. See, for
example, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
133 The FCC rarely denied broadcaster licenses under its equal employment rules. Lee, The
Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 169. But license denials are reviewable in court.
47 USC § 402(b).
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capriciously – or decline to accord any deference at all.134 The FCC rules
were never challenged directly, but the Court in dicta later described them as
within the agency’s authority to adopt.135
Agency Use of Modern/Implausible Avoidance
The most aggressive form of agency avoidance is the modern/implausible vari-
ant. Not surprisingly, in the only historical example I am aware of in which an
agency considered it, the agency declined to deploy it. According to Tani, in
1962, HEW considered whether it violated equal protection for the federal gov-
ernment to fund racially discriminatory school districts in the South. In other
policy contexts, the agency’s General Counsel was willing to condition funding
on recipients obeying constitutional commands.136 The General Counsel did
this despite the fact that whether constitutional commands followed federal
dollars was, in his opinion, “‘open to serious legal doubt.’”137 What gave him
pause in the schools case was that there, avoiding those constitutional doubts
“meant contravening a statutory mandate.”138 Instead, the agency opted for a
more modest and statutorily grounded approach.139
HEW need not have been so chary of avoiding its constitutional doubts even
in the face of a conflicting statutory command. Above I argued that when the
agency faces an ambiguous statute and chooses among interpretations within
that zone of ambiguity, Congress has sufficient checks to make the agency’s use
of modern avoidance unobjectionable. Does it change the analysis if an agency
uses modern avoidance to read exceptions into absolute statutory commands?
In one sense, the agency is acting further afield of Congress’s instructions and
thus more unfaithfully. But at its heart, the faithless agent critique stems from
assumptions about what Congress would want the agency to do. Making this
argument in full is beyond the scope of this chapter, but my intuition is that
134 The rubric under which the Court would address the question is uncertain. As discussed
above in note 64, the Court might not address this issue under arbitrary and capricious review
and might not find a constitutional problem under § 706(2)(B). If so, Chevron reasonableness
review may still provide a meaningful check. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 US
837 (1984). Or a reviewing court might refuse Chevron deference where an agency’s statutory
interpretation involves constitutional questions. The Supreme Court has done so where an
agency interpretation raised serious constitutional questions it determined Congress had not
intended to raise. Solid Waste Agency v. US Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 US 159, 172–74 (2001).
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Lee, The Workplace Constitution, supra note 2, at 210. NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n,
425 US 662, 665 n.2 (1976).
136 Tani, supra note 2, at 876, 879. 137 Id. at 879. 138 Id.
139 Id. at 879 n.278. Indeed, Tani notes that the agency took its most modest approach in regards
to publicly funded hospitals because the funding statute expressly authorized separate but
equal hospitals. Id.
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the key question for this imagined Congress would be whether the agency
should avoid constitutionally dubious interpretations at all, not whether it
should do so in the face of ambiguous but not determinate statutory text.
Further, in the modern/implausible context all the same congressional checks
would apply. If those checks are enough to assuage concerns about agencies
employing modern/plausible avoidance, they should be enough to assuage
those concerns here. In other words, in my view, the more powerful challenge
to agencies deploying avoidance is whether or not Congress can adequately
check its agent than how far afield of Congress’s commands the agency might
go. As regards the judicial role, the threat of usurpation stems from the fact
of modern avoidance itself, not the statute in question’s ambiguity or lack
thereof. Therefore, if the FCC example is acceptable, the HEW one should
be too.
∗ ∗ ∗
History demonstrates that agencies have persistently interpreted and imple-
mented the Constitution in ways that do not meet the transparent, partici-
patory model of administrative constitutionalism defended by its proponents.
Agencies have also deployed the constitutional avoidance canon, a form of
administrative constitutionalism and statutory interpretation scholars have cri-
tiqued. One conclusion would be that whatever theoretical benefits admin-
istrative constitutionalism holds, in practice it is a source of concern and a
target for correction if not elimination. As I have argued above, however,
those historical examples can also invite scholars to broaden the scope of nor-
matively defensible administrative constitutionalism to include instances that
are secret, insular, avoidant, in conflict with statutory text, or distinct from
Supreme Court doctrine. Such instances of administrative constitutionalism
may provide other values such as benefitting from agency expertise and fos-
tering agency engagement with the Constitution. And even if they sill raise
normative concerns, including ones of accountability and legitimacy, scholars
should consider antidotes other than transparency, participation, or prohibi-
tion. In addition to the types of congressional and judicial oversight described
above, these could include the types of internal managerial controls that Jerry
L. Mashaw has long favored.140 They could also focus on frictional checks
within and among agencies.141
140 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Dis-
ability Claims (1983); Mashaw, supra note 1.
141 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314 (2006); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423 (2009); Renan, The
Fourth Amendment, supra note 56.
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There is much to the transparent, participatory versions of administrative
constitutionalism that have been the primary focus of its defenders thus far.
This chapter is a preliminary effort to develop historically informed theoretical
arguments that administrative constitutionalism can be virtuous even when it
lacks those attributes. Perhaps it is the theory, not the history, that needs to
change.
